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Media Coverage and IPO Pricing Around the World 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study how media coverage impacts pricing of IPOs around the world. Higher media 
coverage in the pre-IPO period leads to lower IPO initial returns. The effect is mitigated in 
countries with better financial reporting quality, greater shareholder rights protection, and more 
stringent media censorship, and for IPOs “certified” by reputable intermediaries, while it is 
amplified in countries with higher levels of media penetration and media trust. Further, IPOs 
with higher pre-IPO media coverage have lower ex-post price revision volatility. Our findings 
suggest that higher pre-IPO media coverage reduces information asymmetry among investors, 
leading to less underpriced IPOs.  
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I. Introduction 
In recent years, the role of media in financial markets has become a focus of increasing 
attention by academics, practitioners, and regulators. While there is a general consensus that 
“media reporting can exert a large causal influence on financial markets” (Tetlock 2015, 
p. 703), the mechanisms through which that influence occurs as well as its implications for 
stock prices remain a subject of ongoing debate. One stream of research posits that, by 
disclosing and disseminating information to a broad population of investors, media coverage 
reduces information asymmetry and enhances informational efficiency of stock prices (Tetlock, 
Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy 2008; Drake, Guest, and Twedt 2014; Peress 2014; Twedt 
2016). Another stream of research asserts that, by placing a firm in the spotlight of investor 
attention, media may exacerbate investor biases, causing stock prices to deviate from their 
fundamental values (Barber and Odean 2008; Dougal et al. 2012; Engelberg, Sasseville, and 
Williams 2012; Chen, Pantzalis, and Park 2013; Hillert, Jacobs, and Müller 2014). 
Research examining the role of media in financial markets is predominantly U.S.-
centric. In contrast, there has been little work published exploring the role of media in the 
global financial markets. As Griffin, Hirschey, and Kelly (2011, p. 3941) note: “Despite the 
perceived importance of the financial media, there has been little attempt to quantify its 
importance internationally or to understand why the impact of media varies across countries.” 
Scarce evidence on the role of media in global financial markets constitutes an important gap 
in the literature given a sharp increase in the amount of capital raised in non-U.S. stock markets 
over the past two decades (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2013). We address this gap by examining 
the impact of media coverage on the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) around the world. 
International IPOs provide an appealing platform for exploring the impact of media 
coverage on stock prices for several reasons. First, IPO firms are typically young, immature, 
and relatively informationally opaque (Ljungqvist 2007). Reflecting these features of IPO firms, 
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both information asymmetry and investor limited attention—the mechanisms through which 
prior research suggests media influences stock price formation—play an important role in 
theories of IPO pricing. Second, legal institutions and the information environment—the 
“building blocks of efficiency” (Hung, Li, and Wang 2015)—both exhibit substantial variation 
across countries, thereby providing a powerful setting to explore the mechanisms through 
which media coverage affects stock prices. Third, to enhance interest in news stories, media 
coverage may be systematically biased toward stocks that experience substantial price changes 
(Shiller 2000; Bhattacharya et al. 2009), making causal inferences regarding the effect of media 
on stock prices problematic. Since IPOs do not have a share price history, the issue of reverse 
causality is mitigated in the IPO setting. 
Prior research offers competing insights regarding the sign of the media coverage-IPO 
pricing relation. On the one hand, higher pre-IPO media coverage may reduce the 
“underpricing discount” in the offer price, resulting in lower IPO initial returns.1 Prior research 
(Rock 1986; Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm 1990; Spatt and Srivastava 
1991; Michaely and Shaw 1994; Busaba and Chang 2010) shows that, in the presence of 
informed investors, IPO allocations have to involve underpriced stock. In the Rock (1986) 
model, some investors are assumed to be better informed about the true value of the shares on 
offer. This imposes a “winner’s curse” on uninformed investors: they bid successfully for 
unattractive offerings, while in attractive offerings their demand is crowded out by informed 
investors. To prevent uninformed investors’ withdrawal from the IPO market, new issues must 
be underpriced to allow uninformed investors to earn normal returns. Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) develop models in 
which underwriters elicit indications of interest from investors, which are then used in setting 
                                                 
1 IPO initial return is measured as the percentage difference between the price at which the IPO shares are sold to 
investors (the offer price) and the first-day closing price of shares in the aftermarket. 
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the offer price. However, in the absence of inducements, informed investors have strong 
incentives to misrepresent positive information. To induce informed investors to reveal 
truthfully their information, the offer price needs to be discounted. 
By disclosing and disseminating information, media leads to a more homogeneous 
distribution of information among investors, thereby reducing the information gap between 
informed and uninformed investors. Further, disclosure and dissemination of information 
reduces the level of ex-ante uncertainty regarding the value of the IPO firm. Since informed 
investors view information production as a call option on the IPO (Beatty and Ritter 1986), 
reduction of valuation uncertainty by the media mitigates investor incentives to engage in 
costly information gathering, thereby alleviating the impact of informational frictions among 
investors on IPO pricing. The above discussion suggests that high pre-IPO media coverage 
should reduce the magnitude of the underpricing in the offer price induced by informational 
frictions, and thus should be negatively associated with IPO initial returns. 
An alternative perspective suggests that, by making an IPO firm more visible to retail 
investors in the aftermarket trading, high pre-IPO media coverage should lead to higher IPO 
initial returns. Attention is a scarce cognitive resource (Kahneman 1973). Consequently, there 
are cognitive and temporal limits to how much information an investor can process (Odean 
1999; Barber and Odean 2008), making visibility of a firm’s stock to investors an important 
attribute influencing their investment decisions. The impact of limited attention—and thus, the 
role of firm visibility—is particularly pronounced among individual (or retail) investors, who 
lack resources such as manpower and formal models to attend to and process information that 
is available to institutional investors (Battalio and Mendenhall 2005; Barber and Odean 2008). 
Further, limited attention has a stronger impact on buying, as individual investors search across 
thousands of stocks, than selling, where individual investors generally choose only from the 
set of stocks they own (Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2005; Barber and Odean 2008). 
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The role of media in priming investor attention could be particularly important in the 
context of IPOs, where most of the companies are relatively young and, therefore, less visible 
to investors. As discussed, by placing a firm in the spotlight of public discussion, media catches 
investors’ attention (Engelberg and Parsons 2011; Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura 2014; Hillert 
et al. 2014). Such an effect is particularly pronounced among the retail investors, who are net 
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks due to their lack of ability and resources to attend to and 
process information in a timely manner (Barber and Odean 2008). Consequently, by attracting 
retail investor attention to a new issue, higher pre-IPO media coverage may boost the price of 
a new issue in early aftermarket trading, resulting in higher IPO initial returns.2,3 
In summary, insights from prior research offer competing theoretical predictions 
regarding the impact of media coverage on IPO pricing. The information asymmetry reduction 
mechanism suggests that higher pre-IPO media coverage alleviates informational frictions 
among the parties involved in an IPO, resulting in lower IPO initial returns. The visibility 
enhancement mechanism suggests that, by attracting retail investor attention to a new issue in 
the aftermarket trading, higher pre-IPO media coverage leads to higher IPO initial returns. 
Since it is not clear a priori which of the two mechanisms dominates, we frame the impact of 
media coverage on IPO pricing as an empirical question. 
                                                 
2  The models of Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) are particularly relevant to 
understanding the potential interplay between pre-IPO media coverage, IPO pricing, and investor attention. These 
models assume that there are two types of investor, informed institutional investors and individual investors who 
are assumed to be bullish (i.e., net buyers) at the time of the offering. The investment banker sets the offer price 
above its true value but below the valuation of individual investors. This allows the issuer to benefit from a higher 
valuation than appropriate, given the intrinsic value of the issue (as reflected in institutional investor valuations). 
In turn, institutional investors benefit from flipping their shares to individual investors in the early aftermarket 
trading. Hence, by promoting a new issue to retail investors, high pre-IPO media coverage may increase IPO 
valuation in the aftermarket relative to the final offer price, resulting in higher IPO initial returns. Said differently, 
the theoretical mechanisms advanced by Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) stipulate that the impact of 
investor limited attention—and, by inference, the role of pre-IPO media coverage in attracting investor attention—
will be reflected in the higher spread between the final offer price (set in the primary market) and the price at 
which the new issue is traded in the early aftermarket trading. 
3 Relatedly, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) measure the effect of investor attention on IPO underpricing through 
Google searches of firms during the IPO filing period. They find that high levels of Google searches are associated 
with higher initial returns. 
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Using a sample of 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries for the period 2000–2014, we find 
that higher pre-IPO media coverage is associated with lower IPO initial returns. This finding 
is in line with the information asymmetry reduction mechanism. The documented effect of 
media coverage is economically meaningful: in our sample, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in pre-IPO media coverage, on average, is associated with a decrease of 508 basis points in 
IPO initial returns. The documented effect of media coverage is robust to alternative model and 
sample specifications and holds in country-by-country and year-by-year regression analyses. 
The IPO initial return and the level of pre-IPO media coverage could both be driven by 
firm or underwriter attributes not accounted for in our analysis. Hence, endogeneity is a 
potential concern in our setting. To address this concern, we conduct two tests. First, we adopt 
a quasi-natural experiment approach, using national media strikes as exogenous shocks to 
media coverage (Peress 2014). Second, we estimate our model using an instrumental variable 
estimation approach. Following Dai, Parwada, and Zhang (2015), we use a firm’s geographic 
proximity to a Dow Jones branch as an instrument for media coverage. The negative association 
between media coverage and IPO initial returns holds in both analyses. Therefore, we conclude 
that our findings are unlikely to be driven by endogenous effects. 
We further explore cross-sectional patterns in the strength of the documented media 
coverage–IPO pricing relation. If our arguments are valid, the documented effect of media 
coverage on IPO pricing should be mitigated (amplified) in settings where the role of media in 
generating and disseminating information among investors is less (more) salient.  
We commence our cross-sectional analysis by examining the role of country-specific 
financial reporting quality and shareholder rights protection in the media coverage–IPO pricing 
relation. Higher quality of financial reporting system enhances the transparency of financial 
reports (Bhattacharya et al. 2003) and thus should reduce information asymmetry associated 
with an IPO. The legal rules of jurisdictions in which securities are issued and the quality of 
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their enforcement are important determinants of what rights securities holders have and how 
well these rights are protected, which in turn determines their willingness to finance firms 
(LaPorta et al. 1998). Therefore, we reason that investor exposure to information asymmetry-
related risks—and thus, the role of media in reducing information asymmetry—should be 
mitigated in countries with better financial reporting quality and stronger legal protection of 
investors. Consistent with this, we find that negative association between media coverage and 
IPO initial returns is mitigated in countries with greater accounting conservatism, higher levels 
of anti-director shareholder rights, and stronger securities laws, while it is amplified in 
countries with higher earnings opacity and civil law countries.4  
Next, we examine the impact of media penetration, censorship, and trust on the relation 
between media coverage and IPO pricing. Media penetration facilitates dissemination of news 
through media channels among investors (Zingales 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004). Further, 
media is more effective in disseminating news when it has greater credibility with the public 
(Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales 2008; You, Zhang, and Zhang 2017). In contrast, media 
censorship obstructs the access to valuable information and stifles independent criticism and 
analysis (Geddess and Zaller 1989; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015). In our setting, these 
insights suggest that the role of media coverage in reducing information asymmetry—and thus, 
the documented effect of media coverage—should be stronger in countries with higher level of 
media penetration and media trust and weaker in countries with higher level of media 
censorship. Our findings lend support to these predictions.  
We further explore the impact of IPO certification on the media coverage–IPO pricing 
relation. Prior research suggests that the presence of prestigious intermediaries (e.g., 
prestigious underwriters and/or reputable auditors) reduces information asymmetry faced by 
                                                 
4 Civil law countries generally have weaker legal investor protection compared to common law countries (LaPorta 
et al. 1998). Therefore, investor exposure to information asymmetry-related risks is expected to be more 
pronounced in these countries. 
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investors (Booth and Smith 1986; Titman and Trueman 1986; Carter and Manaster 1990; 
Michaely and Shaw 1994; Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh 2003). In a similar vein, the presence of 
venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public plays an important certification role for a 
new issue (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Loughran and Ritter 2004). Therefore, the role of 
media coverage in reducing informational frictions should be mitigated for IPOs with stronger 
certification characteristics. In line with these arguments, we find that the documented effect 
of media coverage is mitigated for IPOs underwritten by investment banks with strong 
reputation, IPOs audited by Big 4 auditing firms, and IPOs backed by venture capitalist 
investors. 
To further gauge the mechanism driving our findings, we supplement our analysis with 
three sets of tests. First, we explore the interplay between information asymmetry on the 
primary IPO market, media coverage, and IPO underpricing. If the information asymmetry 
reduction channel plays a role in our setting, we should observe (i) a negative association 
between media coverage and the level of information asymmetry on the primary IPO market, 
and (ii) a positive association between the level of information asymmetry on the primary IPO 
market and IPO initial returns. Using ex-post price revision volatility as a proxy for information 
asymmetry on the primary IPO market, we find support for both predictions.   
We also examine whether the effect of media coverage on IPO initial returns varies 
depending on news content, type, tone, and the timing of the article. We reason that if the 
documented effect of media coverage occurs through the information asymmetry reduction 
mechanism, such an effect should be particularly pronounced for articles that focus on an IPO 
firm’s earnings, as firm earnings play a pivotal role in investor valuation of an IPO (Brau and 
Fawcett 2006; Willenborg, Wu, and Yang 2015). We also reason that the documented effect of 
media coverage should be stronger for the full article category (i.e., articles that provide news 
analysis) compared to other, less informative, types of articles (e.g., news flashes and short 
9 
 
press releases). Further, we expect the role of media in reducing information asymmetry—and 
thus, the documented effect of media coverage—to be weaker when there is greater variance 
in the tone of the media (i.e., greater disagreement in media regarding IPO firm prospects). 
Finally, we expect the documented effect of media coverage to be stronger for news articles 
published closer to the listing date—i.e., when investor interest in the IPO is more likely to 
“heat-up” (Liu et al. 2014). Our results lend support to these predictions. 
We conclude our analysis by reconciling our findings with results from U.S.-based 
studies (Cook, Kieschnick, and Van Ness 2006; Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2017). Focusing 
predominantly on the pre-2000 period, these studies document a positive association between 
media coverage and IPO initial returns on the U.S. market. When considered within the context 
of these studies, our findings suggest that the media coverage-IPO initial returns relationship 
on the U.S. market has undergone a structural shift in the post-2000 period. To examine the 
empirical validity of this conjecture, we supplement our cross-country analysis by comparing 
the relationship between media coverage and IPO initial returns on the U.S. market in the pre-
2000 period with the one in the post-2000 period (the sample period used in our study). 
Consistent with Cook et al. (2006) and Liu et al. (2017), we document a positive association 
between media coverage and IPO initial returns in the pre-2000 period. However, we also find 
that the sign of this relationship becomes significantly negative in the post-2000 period, 
consistent with the information asymmetry reduction channel. The results of additional 
analyses indicate that the shift in the sign is not driven by a decline in the information 
technology IPOs following the collapse of the dot-com bubble and is robust to using alternative 
measures of media coverage. Collectively, these results suggest that the visibility enhancement 
channel has dominated the media coverage-IPO pricing relationship on the U.S. market in the 
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pre-2000 period, whereas information asymmetry reduction channel dominates this 
relationship in the post-2000 period.5 
We contribute to the literature along several important dimensions. Our first 
contribution is to the literature examining the impact of media on capital markets (see Tetlock 
2015 for a review). So far, this strand of literature has been predominantly U.S.-centric, thereby 
offering limited insight regarding the role of media in global financial markets (Griffin et al. 
2011). We advance this literature by generating comprehensive evidence on the role of media 
in reducing information asymmetry within the context of international IPOs. In this context, 
our study relates to Griffin et al. (2011), who also investigate the role of media in global 
financial markets. While Griffin et al. (2011) focus on the interplay between media and stock 
market volatility around news events, we examine the impact of media on IPO pricing. 
 Second, we contribute to the literature on IPO pricing (see Ljungqvist 2007 for review). 
Understanding the determinants of IPO pricing in global markets is particularly important 
given a substantial increase in the share of world IPO activity by non-U.S. firms (Doidge et al. 
2013). Our findings suggest that higher media coverage leads to lower IPO initial returns, 
consistent with the notion that media coverage reduces information asymmetry associated with 
a new issue. Our findings also suggest that media coverage-IPO pricing relation on the U.S. 
market has undergone a structural shift, and future studies may delve into mechanisms driving 
this shift. This suggests an avenue for future research. 
Third, our study contributes to the growing literature on the role of financial reporting 
quality and legal institutions in capital markets (LaPorta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2008; 
Spamann 2010; He and Hu 2014). Our findings suggest that the role of media in reducing 
information asymmetry among investors is particularly pronounced in countries with poorer 
quality financial reporting and weak shareholder rights protections. In this context, our study 
                                                 
5 We discuss potential reasons for this structural shift in Section VII. 
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addresses the Ljungqvist (2007) call to examine the determinants of IPO pricing in a cross-
country setting. These results also cast media as an important informal institution that alleviates 
informational frictions in settings where formal institutions offer limited protection to 
investors, thus potentially carrying policy implications for regulators. 
II. Sample and Variables 
A. Sample 
We obtain media coverage data from RavenPack, a leading global media database 
widely used in recent finance and accounting research (e.g., Shroff, Verdi, and Yu 2014; Dai 
et al. 2015; Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang 2015; Twedt 2016; Bushman, Williams, and 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2017; You et al. 2017). Starting in 2000, RavenPack has gathered news 
articles around the world from three major sources: (1) Dow Jones newswires, regional editions 
of The Wall Street Journal, and Barron’s; (2) business publishers, national and local news, 
blog sites, and government and regulatory updates; and (3) press releases and regulatory, 
corporate, and news services, including PR Newswire, the CNW Group (formerly the Canadian 
News Wire), and the Regulatory News Service. 
We obtain IPO data from the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum New Issue 
Database. Firm-level financial information and stock returns data are obtained from Datastream 
and Worldscope. Data on country-level economic development and quality of listing stock 
exchange are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database. 
Following prior literature (Cook et al. 2006; Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014), we exclude unit 
offers (IPOs with warrants), closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, and limited 
partnerships. We follow prior research on international IPOs (e.g., Lin, Pukthuanthong, and 
Walker 2013) by excluding issues with a converted offer price below US$1.00. Further, we 
require IPO firms to have information in Datastream or Worldscope at least in the IPO year. 
We also require each country in our sample to have at least 10 IPOs. Our final sample consists 
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of 11,716 IPOs from 39 countries spanning the period 2000–2014. To mitigate the effect of 
potential outliers, we winsorize all variables (except for dummy variables) at both the upper 
and lower 1-percentile. 
B. Variables 
Our dependent variable is IPO first-day return (First-day return). Following prior 
studies (e.g., Ellul and Pagano 2006; Colak et al. 2017), we calculate First-day return as the 
first-day closing price of an IPO minus its offer price scaled by the offer price. Our explanatory 
variable of interest is media coverage in the pre-IPO period (Media coverage). In constructing 
this variable, we follow Liu et al.(2014) and count the total number of news articles about the 
IPO firm within the 30-day period prior to the IPO date.6 We use the log-transformed number 
of news articles as our measure of pre-IPO media coverage, defined as the natural logarithm of 
1 plus the number of news articles about the IPO firm in a 30-day window prior to the IPO 
date. RavenPack assigns a relevance score for each news article (ranging from 0 to 100), 
indicating how strong the news article is related to a specific firm. Following prior studies (e.g., 
Drake et al. 2014; Dang et al. 2015), we focus on the news articles with a relevance score of 
100 to ensure that these articles are primarily about the firm under discussion. We further utilize 
the event similarity key and RavenPack story identification code to identify the original news 
releases and exclude duplicate entries. If an IPO firm has no reported news articles during the 
30-day period, we set the number of news articles to zero following Cook et al. (2006).  
Our selection of control variables follows prior literature (e.g., Ellul and Pagano 2006; 
Colak et al. 2017). Firm size is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets of the IPO 
firm. Profitability is defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt over total assets. Market-to-book is calculated 
                                                 
6 We focus on 30-days prior to the IPO date because investor interest in the IPO is more likely to “heat-up” in a 
short window leading up to the firm’s listing (Liu et al. 2014). 
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as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Asset turnover is calculated as 
sales divided by total assets. Bookbuilding is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO is 
conducted using a bookbuilding method, and zero otherwise. Following Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) and Doidge et al. (2013), we also control for the state of the economy and the level of 
capital market development in the country where an IPO takes place. We include GDP per 
capita growth, measured as growth in annual GDP per capita, Market size, measured as the 
ratio of annual total value of stocks traded to GDP, and Market turnover, measured as the 
aggregate stock market turnover ratio. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
C. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution and summary statistics of the variables in the 
analysis. Panel A presents the distribution of IPOs across the 39 countries in our sample. The 
panel shows that China has the largest number of IPOs, followed by U.S., Japan, U.K., and 
Australia. The panel also shows that China has the highest average first-day return (70.4%), 
while Portugal has the lowest average first-day return (-8.9%). In terms of pre-IPO media 
coverage, the panel shows that Taiwan has the largest average number of news articles 
(24.553), while Ireland has the smallest average number of news articles (6.409). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel B presents the distribution of IPOs across time in our sample. The panel shows 
that the global IPO market reached its peak in 2007 in terms of the number of IPOs and declined 
gradually thereafter. This observation is in line with recent industry reports (e.g., Ernst and 
Young 2016). Average IPO first-day return was highest in 2010 (72.0%) and lowest in 2000 
(20.4%). The average number of articles covering an IPO firm in the 30-day window prior to 
the listing day reached its peak in 2009 (21.858) and was lowest in 2000 (10.24). 
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Panel C presents the summary statistics of the variables. The panel shows that the 
average First-day return in our sample is 38.7%.7 The average number of articles is 14.058 and 
the average value of the log-transformed number of articles (i.e., average Media coverage) 
is 1.755. The average IPO firm in our sample has Firm size of 4.811, Profitability of 0.042, and 
Leverage of 0.121. The highest Variance Inflation Factor among the explanatory variables is 
1.26, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in our analysis. 
III. Empirical Results 
A. Univariate Analysis 
We begin with a univariate analysis of the media coverage-IPO initial returns relation. 
We divide sample IPO firms into 11 groups based on the number of news articles about an IPO 
firm appearing within the 30-day window prior to the IPO date. We assign IPOs with no news 
articles to Group 0 and then divide the remaining IPOs into 10 equal groups based on the 
number of news articles. Group 1 has the lowest number of news articles while Group 10 has 
the highest. We then calculate the average IPO first-day return for each of the 11 groups and 
plot the results in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the average IPO first-day return in Group 0 is 
59.9%, whereas the average IPO first-day return in Group 10 is only 17.6%. The difference 
between the average returns in the two groups is statistically significant (p-value<0.01). The 
figure also shows that average IPO first-day return decreases monotonically when moving from 
Group 0 to Group 10. As discussed earlier, this pattern is consistent with media coverage 
reducing information asymmetry among investors, which, in turn, results in a lower degree of 
IPO underpricing. Next, we explore whether this effect persists in a multivariate framework. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
B. Baseline Regression Analysis 
                                                 
7 Average IPO first-day return in our sample is higher than that reported in prior studies (e.g., Lin et al. 2013; 
Boulton, Smart, and Zutter 2010). This is because these studies do not include Chinese IPOs, which have 
exceptionally high IPO first-day return (Tian 2011).  
. 
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Here, we examine the relation between pre-IPO media coverage and IPO first-day 
return using regression analysis. The specification of our baseline regression is as follows:  
 
 
  
(1) 
where i denotes IPO firm, j denotes country, t denotes year, FE denotes fixed effects, and ε 
is the error term. The model is estimated with year, country, and industry fixed effects included. 
We use the 10 industry classifications as detailed on Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). The model is estimated using 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity.8  
We report the results in Table 2 using a set of nested models. Column (1) presents the 
results with industry, year, and country fixed effects but without control variables; column (2) 
presents the results with firm-level control variables; column (3) presents the results of our full 
baseline model, which also includes country-level control variables. In all three specifications, 
the coefficient of Media coverage is significantly negative (highest p-value<0.01), suggesting 
that higher media coverage is associated with lower IPO first-day return. These results confirm 
our findings from the univariate analysis and are consistent with media coverage reducing the 
magnitude of IPO underpricing. The coefficient of Media coverage in Column (3) suggests that 
a one-standard-deviation increase in Media coverage (1.373) reduces IPO first-day return by 
0.037×1.373 = 0.0508 or 5.08 percentage points which constitutes a 13.14% reduction 
compared to the mean. Hence, we conclude that the effect of media coverage on IPO pricing is 
economically meaningful. The results for the control variables are largely consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Ellul and Pagano 2006; Doidge et al. 2013; Colak et al.2017): IPO first-day return 
                                                 
8 In (untabulated) robustness test, we repeat all our analyses with standard errors clustered at the country level and 
obtain qualitatively similar results. 
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is positively related to Firm size, Profitability, Leverage, Market-to-book, and Market size, 
while negatively related to Asset turnover and Bookbuilding. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
C. Country- and Year-Specific Regressions 
Since our sample includes IPOs from multiple countries and multiple years, a potential 
concern is that the documented effect of media coverage is driven by IPOs from a particular 
country or a particular year. To examine this issue, we conduct two tests. 
First, we estimate our baseline regression model for each country. Each country-specific 
regression includes all the control variables from Equation (1), industry fixed effects, and year 
fixed effects. To account for the appropriate level of degrees of freedom, we perform tests only 
for countries with at least 50 IPOs in our sample, which results in 24 country-by-country 
regressions. We present the results in Panel A of Table 3. For brevity, we report only the 
coefficient of Media coverage. The table shows that the coefficient of Media coverage is 
negative in 20 out of the 24 countries. Further, despite a sharp reduction in sample size available 
to estimate country-specific regression models, the coefficient of Media coverage is 
significantly negative at the 10% level or better in 17 countries. These results suggest that the 
documented effect of media coverage is not limited to IPOs from a particular country. 
Second, we estimate our baseline regression model for each year. Each year-specific 
regression includes all the IPO-firm-level control variables from Equation (1), industry fixed 
effects, and country fixed effects. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3 showing that 
the coefficient of Media coverage is significantly negative at the 10% level or better in 12 out 
of 15 year-specific regressions.9 Based on these results, we conclude that the documented effect 
of media coverage is not driven by IPO observations from a particular year. 
                                                 
9 The coefficient of Media coverage is not significant in 2000, 2002, and 2008, possibly due to high turbulence in 
stock markets during the dot-com bubble and the Global Financial Crisis periods. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
IV. Robustness Tests 
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we conduct a battery of sensitivity 
tests. For brevity, we report only the coefficient of Media coverage. Control variables and fixed 
effects are included in all regressions but are not tabulated. 
First, we explore the robustness of our findings to alternative time windows over which 
IPO initial returns are measured. Ljungqvist (2007) notes that in less developed capital markets, 
or in the presence of daily volatility limits, aftermarket prices may take some time before they 
equilibrate supply and demand. In our setting, these insights suggest that using first-day IPO 
return may underestimate the impact of media coverage. To examine this issue, we re-estimate 
our baseline model twice: once using IPO returns measured over one week following listing 
day and once using IPO returns measured over two weeks following listing day (Ellul and 
Pagano 2006; Lin et al. 2013). The results are reported in Panel A of Table 4 showing that the 
coefficient of Media coverage is significantly negative in both tests and that the magnitude of 
the coefficient is similar to that of our baseline model. Hence, we conclude that our findings 
are not sensitive to the choice of time window over which IPO initial returns are 
measured.Second, we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of pre-IPO 
media coverage. As outlined earlier, we construct our media coverage measure by counting the 
number of news articles over the 30-day window prior to the IPO date. To ensure that our 
results are not driven by specific choice of pre-IPO time window, we re-estimate our baseline 
model twice: once with media coverage constructed using a 60-day pre-IPO window, and once 
with media coverage constructed using a 90-day pre-IPO window. Last, we construct the media 
coverage measure using data from Factiva to verify that our findings are not driven by the 
choice of the media database. The results, reported in Panel B of Table 4, show that the 
coefficient of Media coverage remains significantly negative in all tests. 
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Third, we augment Equation (1) with additional control variables to mitigate concern 
that our findings are driven by some variable (or variables) not included in the baseline model. 
Specifically, we include Advertising intensity, calculated as the ratio of advertising expenditure 
to sales (Chemmanur and Yan 2017), IPO float, measured as the percentage of regular shares 
issued by the firm to the public and available to trade (Brennan and Franks 1997), and Hot 
issue market, measured as average IPO initial return for IPOs issued over the three months 
prior to a firm’s IPO (Bradley and Jordan 2002). We further include IPO size, measured as the 
ratio of total IPO proceeds to the book value of total assets, IPO age, measured as the log-
transformed number of years from the year when the firm was founded up to the year of listing, 
and Cash balance, measured as the ratio of cash holdings of the IPO firm scaled by total assets 
(Ellul and Pagano 2006; Lin et al. 2013). The results are reported in Panel C of Table 4 showing 
that the coefficient of Media coverage remains significantly negative in this estimation.10 
Fourth, we examine the robustness of our results to exclusion of IPOs with no 
information in RavenPack during the 30-day window. As discussed, we follow prior research 
by setting the number of news articles to zero if an IPO has no information in RavenPack. To 
ensure that our findings are not driven by this practice, we re-estimate our baseline regression 
model after excluding these IPOs from the sample. The results, reported in Panel D of Table 4, 
show that the coefficient of Media coverage remains significantly negative in this estimation. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We also consider the possibility of confounding effects in the media coverage-IPO 
pricing relationship, where the information asymmetry channel in the primary market 
dominates the attention channel in the secondary market.  To examine this possibility, we 
decompose IPO initial return into its primary market component (i.e., the difference between 
                                                 
10 We do not include these additional control variables in our main design because of their effects on our sample 
size. Our baseline sample has 11,716 observations (see Table 2). When additional controls are included, the 
sample size reduces to 7,481 observations. 
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first-day opening price and the final offer price scaled by the final offer price) and the secondary 
market component (i.e., the difference between first-day closing price and first-day opening 
price scaled by first-day opening price). We then re-estimate our baseline model twice, using 
each of the two return components as the dependent variable, respectively. Due to data 
availability, the sample size for this test is reduced to 2,232 observations. The results of this 
test are reported in Panel E of Table 4. The coefficient of Media coverage is significantly 
negative in the primary market return regression, consistent with the information asymmetry 
reduction channel, while insignificant in the secondary market return regression, thus, 
providing no evidence on the attention channel.   
Last, we control for potential non-monotonicity and non-linearity in the media 
coverage-IPO pricing relation (e.g., Pollock and Rindova 2003).11 To that end, we estimate our 
baseline model using semiparametric technique (Robinson 1988). This technique estimates the 
link function between the dependent variable (in our setting, First-day return) and the 
explanatory variable of interest (in our setting, Media coverage) nonparametrically, thereby 
imposing no assumptions (such as monotonicity or linearity) on the functional form of the 
examined relation. The results of semiparametric estimation are reported in Figure 2. The figure 
depicts monotonic and, generally, linear negative relation between media coverage and IPO 
initial returns, with the upper tail of Media coverage variable being the only exception, where 
the slope of the curve seems to flatten.12 Consistent with this, the (untabulated) results indicate 
that allowing for non-parametric (i.e., assumption-free) specification of the media coverage-
                                                 
11 The examined relation may be non-monotonic if there is a “tipping point” in the level of media coverage where 
the visibility enhancement mechanism overtakes the information asymmetry reduction mechanism, causing the 
sign of the relation to change from negative to positive. The non-linearity in the media coverage-IPO initial returns 
relation may arise if, after media coverage reaches a certain level, the role of additional media coverage in reducing 
information asymmetry—and thus, it’s effect on IPO initial returns—weakens. 
12 Importantly, the flexibility of semiparametric estimation comes at cost of lower estimation accuracy as reflected 
in larger standard errors (e.g., Pagan and Ullah 1999). An increase in standard errors is particularly pronounced at 
the tails of the distribution of the explanatory variable, where the observations are scarce. Therefore, the non-
linearity at the upper tail of Media coverage reported in Figure 2 may also be driven by sampling issues associated 
with low estimation accuracy at the tails of the Media coverage variable. 
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IPO initial returns relation leads to no discernible improvement in the model performance 
compared to a more parsimonious linear regression specification. To further control for 
potential non-linearity, we examine the robustness of our findings to (i) excluding the 
observations in the upper tail of Media coverage, and (ii) using decile-ranking of Media 
coverage. The (untabulated) results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
V. Endogeneity 
A potential concern is that our findings could be driven by some attribute (or attributes) 
correlated with both the level of pre-IPO media coverage and IPO first-day return. While the 
results reported earlier partially alleviate this concern, they do not rule it out completely. To 
further examine this issue, we conduct two tests. 
In the first test, we use national media strikes as exogenous shocks to media coverage 
(Peress 2014). Consistent with Peress (2014), we focus on strikes that affect the press on a 
national scale and involve the media sector only. These strikes are called by journalists, print, 
or distribution workers, and typically relate to their profession’s economic conditions (i.e., 
employment, pay, pensions, tax breaks, state subsidies, and other benefits). Therefore, these 
media strikes are not driven by—and thus, are exogenous to—stock market movements and/or 
economy-wide conditions during the period of the strike (Peress 2014). 
We use the list of media strikes reported by Peress (2014, Table 1). During our sample 
period, we identify 31 eligible national media strikes that meet the criteria discussed in the 
previous paragraph. To perform the test, we first identify 581 IPOs that were conducted in the 
countries where the media strikes took place during our sample period. Then, we assign each 
of these IPOs to either the “strike” group or the “non-strike” group. The “strike” group includes 
the IPOs with at least one media strike taking place in the same country during the 30-day 
window prior to the IPO date. This results in 62 IPOs in this group. The “non-strike” group 
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includes all the remaining 519 IPOs. Finally, we construct a strike dummy (Strike) equal to 1 
if the IPO is in the “strike” group, and zero if it is in the “non-strike” group. 
To assess the validity of using media strikes as exogenous shocks to media coverage in 
our setting, we first test whether there is a significant difference in media coverage between 
the “strike” and “non-strike” groups. The results, presented in Panel A of Table 5, show that 
the mean number of news articles for IPOs in the “strike” (“non-strike”) group is 9.726 
(14.202), and the difference between the two groups is statistically significant (p-value<0.04). 
This finding is consistent with media strikes reducing the level of pre-IPO media coverage. 
Next, we examine the impact of media strikes on IPO first-day return. To perform the test, we 
estimate the same regression specification as in Equation (1), but with the strike dummy as the 
explanatory variable of interest. The results, reported in Panel B of Table 5, show that the 
coefficient of the strike dummy is significantly positive (p-value<0.03), suggesting that a lower 
level of media coverage resulting from media strikes leads to higher IPO first-day return. These 
findings support the causal effect of media coverage on IPO first-day return.13 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second, we estimate our baseline regression model using an instrumental variable 
approach. The media coverage of a firm is dependent on the distance between the firm and 
news outlets (Gurun and Butler 2012). Therefore, we follow Dai et al. (2015) by using a firm’s 
geographic proximity to a Dow Jones branch as an instrumental variable. Specifically, we 
construct a categorical variable Proximity to DJ branch, which equals 2 if the IPO firm is 
headquartered in a metropolitan area with at least one Dow Jones news branch, 1 if the IPO 
firm is headquartered in a country with at least one Dow Jones news branch but in a 
metropolitan area without any Dow Jones news branch, and zero otherwise. We obtain 
                                                 
13 To ensure that our results do not reflect economic effects of media strikes on IPO firms in media-related 
industries, we repeat the analysis in Table 5 after excluding these IPOs from our sample. In our sample, we have 
seven IPOs in media-related industries (SIC codes 2711, 3663, and 4833). The (untabulated) results indicate that 
exclusion of these IPOs from our sample has no material impact on our findings. 
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information about the location of Dow Jones news branches around the world from the Dow 
Jones website (https://www.dowjones.com/). 
In our setting, a valid instrumental variable should meet the following two selection 
criteria (Larcker and Rusticus 2010): (1) it should be significantly correlated with Media 
coverage, and (2) it should not be correlated with the residuals of our baseline regression model 
(i.e., it should not have a direct effect on IPO first-day return). Consistent with the first criterion, 
the results reported in Column (1) of Table 6 show that the coefficient of Proximity to DJ 
branch in the Media coverage regression is significantly positive. The (untabulated) partial F-
statistic for the exclusion test of Proximity to DJ branch from the Media coverage regression 
is above the critical value of 8.96 (Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002), suggesting that the weak 
instrument issue is not a concern in our setting. Consistent with the second criterion, there is 
no ex-ante reason to suggest that, after controlling for Media coverage, the distance between 
the IPO firm headquarters and a Dow Jones news branch has a direct effect on IPO first-day 
return. Therefore, we conclude that Proximity to DJ branch is a valid instrument in our setting. 
The results of instrumental variable estimation are reported in Column (2) of Table 6 showing 
that the coefficient of Media coverage is significantly negative (p-value<0.01). This result 
provides further support that our findings are not driven by endogenous effects. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
VI. Cross-Sectional Tests 
A. Moderating Effects of Country-Level Institutions  
In this section, we examine the effects of country-level financial reporting quality, 
shareholder rights protection, and emerging market status on the media coverage–IPO pricing 
relation. Higher quality financial reporting alleviates information asymmetry among investors 
and mitigates associated agency problems (Mahoney 1995). In terms of shareholder rights 
protection, legal rules and the quality of their enforcement at a country-level where an IPO is 
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carried out determine what rights securities holders have and how well these rights are 
executed, which in turn determines the willingness of investors to finance firms (LaPorta et al. 
1998). Given the above discussion, we reason that the role of media in alleviating information 
asymmetry-related risks—and thus, the documented effect of media coverage—is mitigated in 
countries with higher quality financial disclosure and stronger legal protection of investors.  
We begin by examining the effect of country-specific financial reporting quality on the 
media coverage–IPO pricing relation. Following Boulton et al. (2011, 2017), we use Earnings 
opacity and Accounting conservatism scores of the country where the IPO takes place as our 
measures of country-specific financial reporting quality.14 A higher value of Earnings opacity 
indicates lower quality of financial disclosure, whilst a higher value of Accounting 
conservatism indicates higher quality of financial disclosure. To examine the effect of country-
level financial reporting quality on the media coverage–IPO pricing relation, we modify our 
baseline model to include the interaction term between the two measures and Media coverage, 
respectively. The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 showing that the 
coefficient of Media coverage×Earnings opacity is significantly negative and the coefficient 
of Media coverage×Accounting conservatism is significantly positive (highest p-value<0.01). 
These results support our prediction that the effect of media coverage on IPO pricing is 
mitigated in countries with higher financial reporting quality. 
Next, we examine the effect of shareholder rights protection on the media coverage–
IPO pricing relation. We employ three measures of shareholder rights protection. Our first 
measure is Security law, which measures the average number of country-specific disclosure 
                                                 
14 Earnings opacity score for each country captures the extent of earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and 
earnings smoothing. Higher earnings opacity score reflects lower quality of information conveyed by firms’ 
earnings to investors (Boulton et al. 2011). Accounting conservatism refers to accounting practices, policies, and 
tendencies through which firms reported net asset values are understated relative to their market values. Boulton 
et al. (2017) show that IPOs are underpriced less in markets where accounting conservatism is more prevalent, 
consistent with accounting conservatism providing investors better information about IPO firms. The earnings 
opacity score is not available for Chile, Poland, and Russia. The accounting conservatism score is not available 
for China, Poland, and Russia. Therefore, we exclude IPOs from these countries in tests using the two measures. 
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requirements by stock exchange, liability standards, and public enforcement of legal contracts 
(LaPorta et al. 2006). We obtain the data required for the construction of Security law from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators. Our second measure is Shareholder rights, which is 
the anti-director self-dealing rights index of the country where the IPO occurs. We obtain the 
index values from Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). Higher values for Security law 
and Shareholder rights indicate better investor protection. Our third measure is Civil law, 
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO occurs in a civil law country in our sample, 
and zero otherwise.15 In civil law countries, the interests of minority shareholders are not well 
protected, thereby exposing them to greater risk of managerial expropriation (LaPorta et al. 
1998). We interact each of these variables with Media coverage and include the interaction 
terms separately in Equation (1). The results are reported in columns (3)-(5) of Table 7 showing 
that the coefficients of Media coverage×Security law and Media coverage×Shareholder rights 
are both significantly positive, while the coefficient of Media coverage×Civil law is 
significantly negative (highest p-value<0.01). These results support our prediction that the 
effect of media coverage on IPO pricing is mitigated in countries with stronger levels of 
shareholder rights protection.  
Last, we examine the effect of emerging market status on the media coverage–IPO 
pricing relation. To that end, we modify our baseline model to include the interaction term 
between the emerging market dummy (Emerging) and Media coverage.16  The results are 
reported in column (6) of Table 7 showing that the coefficient of the Media 
coverage×Emerging variable is significantly negative (p-value<0.01), suggesting that the 
effect of media coverage on IPO pricing is stronger in the emerging markets. This result is 
                                                 
15 We identify civil law countries following LaPorta et al. (1998). In our sample, the civil law countries are 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. 
16 Emerging markets in our sample include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and South Africa. 
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consistent with emerging markets, typically, having lower quality institutions and weaker 
investor protection than developed markets (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 2011), which elevates 
the role of media in mitigating information asymmetry-related risks. 17 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
B. Moderating Effects of Country-Level Media Characteristics 
In this section, we explore the impact of country-level media penetration, media 
censorship, and media trust on the relation between media coverage and IPO pricing. Prior 
research (e.g., Zingales 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) 
suggests that the breadth of news dissemination through media depends on the level of media 
penetration among the investors—i.e., the extent to which investors have access to and use the 
media channels to obtain the information. These insights suggest that the role of media in 
disseminating information among investors—and thus, the documented effect of media 
coverage—should be stronger in countries with greater level of media penetration.  
We employ two measures of media penetration. Our first measure, Newspaper users, 
captures country-level penetration of press (Dyck and Zingales 2004) and is calculated as the 
proportion of people subscribing to newspapers in a country. Our second measure, Internet 
users, captures country-level internet penetration (Boulton et al. 2015), and is calculated as the 
proportion of people subscribing to the internet in a country. We obtain the data for the 
construction of these variables from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
To test our prediction, we interact each of the two variables with Media coverage and include 
the interaction terms separately in the regression specification in Equation (1). The results are 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 showing that the coefficients of Media 
                                                 
17 We do not control for country fixed effects in regressions reported in Tables 7 and 8 to avoid perfect collinearity 
between the stand-alone effect of the country-specific time-invariant moderator and country fixed effect dummies. 
As an (untabulated) robustness test, we re-estimate the models in Tables 7 and 8 with country fixed effects included 
and without stand-alone effect of the country-specific moderator. Using this alternative specification has no 
material impact on our findings. 
26 
 
coverage×Newspaper users and Media coverage×Internet users are both significantly negative 
(highest p-value=0.031). These results support our prediction that the effect of media coverage 
on IPO pricing is stronger in countries with greater level of media penetration. 
Next, we examine the impact of country-level media censorship on the media coverage–
IPO pricing relation. By controlling the flow of news and information to the public, media 
censorship obstructs the access to valuable information and stifles independent criticism and 
analysis (Geddess and Zaller 1989; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015). Based on these insights, 
we expect media censorship to hinder the role of media as an informational intermediary in the 
IPO process. Therefore, we forward that the documented effect of media coverage on IPO 
pricing should be weaker in countries with more stringent media censorship.  
We employ two measures of media censorship. Our first measure, Press censorship, 
captures country-level censorship of the press and reflects the degree of print, broadcast, and 
digital media freedom in a country. Our second measure, Internet censorship, captures country-
level censorship of the internet and reflects the strength of legal and ownership control rights 
over internet service providers, limits on the on-line content, and frequency of user rights 
violations. We obtain the data on media censorship from Freedom House 
(https://freedomhouse.org/). For each of the two variables, larger value indicates more stringent 
censorship. The (untabulated) results indicate that both variables are significantly correlated 
with country-level measures of financial disclosure quality and investor protection in our 
sample. To isolate the effect of censorship, we orthogonalize our censorship measures with 
respect to these variables. We then interact each of the two censorship variables with Media 
coverage and include the interaction terms separately in in Equation (1). The results are 
reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 showing that the coefficients of Media 
coverage×Press censorship and Media coverage×Internet censorship are both significantly 
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positive (highest p-value<0.01). These results support our prediction that the effect of media 
coverage on IPO pricing is weaker in countries with more stringent media censorship. 
Last, we investigate the effect of country-level media trust on the media coverage–IPO 
pricing relation. Prior studies (e.g., Dyck et al. 2008; You et al. 2017) document that media is 
more effective in disseminating news when it has greater trust of the public. Therefore, we 
expect the role of media in reducing information asymmetry—and thus, the documented effect 
of media coverage—to be amplified in countries with greater level of media trust.  
We employ two measures of media trust. Our first measure, Confidence in Press, 
captures country-level confidence in the information disseminated by the press. Our second 
measure, Confidence in TV News, captures country-level confidence in the information 
broadcasted on TV. We obtain data of the two media trust measures from the World Value 
Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp). For each of the two measures, higher 
value indicates greater level of public trust in media. Analogous to our censorship measures, 
we orthogonalize media trust variables with respect to country-level measures of financial 
disclosure quality and investor protection. We then interact each of the two media trust 
variables with Media coverage and include the interaction terms separately in the regression 
specification in Equation (1). The results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 showing 
that the coefficients of Media coverage×Confidence in Press and Media coverage×Confidence 
in TV News are both significantly negative (highest p-value<0.01). These results support our 
prediction that media trust amplifies the effect of media coverage on IPO pricing. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
C. Moderating Effect of IPO Certification 
In this section, we examine the effect of IPO certification on the relation between media 
coverage and IPO pricing. The IPO process involves a substantial degree of information 
asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. To mitigate information asymmetry, 
28 
 
outside investors attempt to obtain information about the IPO firm from various sources. In 
particular, investors are thought to infer the quality of the IPO firm based on whether the IPO 
firm is backed by venture capital firms (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Loughran and Ritter 
2004), whether the firm is audited by a high-quality auditor prior to the IPO (Menon and 
Williams 1991), or whether there is a high-quality underwriter that underwrites the IPO (Carter 
and Manaster 1990). Said differently, the presence of venture capital firms and/or reputable 
intermediaries “certifies” the quality of the issue by mitigating information asymmetry and the 
associated agency concerns. Therefore, we expect the role of media in alleviating informational 
frictions—and thus, the documented effect of media coverage—to be mitigated for IPOs with 
greater levels of certification by the third parties associated with the IPO. 
We employ three measures of IPO certification (Carter and Manaster 1990; Megginson 
and Weiss 1991; Menon and Williams 1991; Loughran and Ritter 2004). Our first measure is 
the venture capital indicator variable (VC back), which is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is backed 
by a venture capital firm, and zero otherwise. Our second measure is the Big 4 auditor indicator 
variable (Big 4 auditor), which is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is audited by one of the Big 4 
auditing firms, and zero otherwise. Our third measure is the reputable underwriter indicator 
variable (Underwriter), which is equal to 1 if the investment bank underwriting the IPO is in 
the top quartile based on combined IPO proceeds, and zero otherwise. We interact each of the 
three variables with Media coverage and include the interaction terms separately in Equation 
(1). The results are reported in Table 9 showing that the coefficient of Media coverage×VC 
back is significantly positive, and so are the coefficients of Media coverage×Big 4 auditor and 
Media coverage×Underwriter (highest p-value=0.012). These results are consistent with strong 
certification characteristics mitigating the effect of media coverage on IPO pricing. 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
VII. Additional Analysis 
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A. Media Coverage and Information Asymmetry on the IPO Primary Market  
As discussed, we argue that higher media coverage mitigates information asymmetry 
among IPO investors, thereby reducing the degree of IPO underpricing aimed to compensate 
investors for the information asymmetry-related risks. In this section, we test the empirical 
relevance of the proposed mechanism in our setting. 
Since information asymmetry is unobservable, providing direct evidence on the 
hypothesized mechanism requires a use of a proxy. Information asymmetry induces 
heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs, resulting in higher volatility of stock prices (Shalen 1993; 
Grundy and Kim 2002). Building on these studies, we employ ex-post price revision volatility 
as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry among the IPO investors. Drawing on prior 
literature (Andersen and Bollerslev 1998; Granger and Sin 2000; Forsberg and Ghysels 2007), 
we construct two measures of ex-post price revision volatility, Revision_Vol_SqRes and 
Revision_Vol_AbsRes. We calculate Revision_Vol_SqRes (Revision_Vol_AbsRes) as the 
square (absolute value) of the price revision regression residual. The price revision regression 
residuals are obtained from regressing price revisions on media coverage and the control 
variables, capturing the deviations of price revisions from their expected values. If the 
hypothesized information asymmetry channel is valid, we should observe (i) a positive 
association between ex-post price revision volatility and IPO first-day returns, and (ii) a 
negative association between media coverage and ex-post price revision volatility. 
First, we examine the association between ex-post price revision volatility and IPO first-
day returns. To that end, we regress First-day return on each of the two measures ex-post price 
revision volatility and the control variables. To ensure that the examined relationship is 
separate from the partial adjustment effect documented in prior IPO literature (e.g., Hanley 
1993; Bradley and Jordan 2002), we also control for the run-ups in IPO prices in this analysis 
(untabulated for brevity). The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 showing 
30 
 
that the two measures load positively in the regressions (highest p-value<0.01). These results 
provide support for our first conjecture—i.e., that, in our sample, higher level of information 
asymmetry is associated with larger underpricing discount. Next, we examine the association 
between media coverage and ex post price revision volatility. To that end, we regress each of 
the two measure of ex-post price revision volatility on Media coverage and the control 
variables. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 showing that Media 
coverage loads negatively in both regressions (highest p-value<0.01). These results provide 
support for our second conjecture—i.e., that, in our sample, higher level of media coverage is 
associated with lower level of information asymmetry.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
B. Effects of the Content, Type, Tone, and Timing of the Article 
In this section, we examine whether the impact of media coverage on IPO initial returns 
varies depending on news content, type, tone, and timing of the article. Prior research suggests 
that a firm’s earnings play a pivotal role in investor assessment and valuation of an IPO (Brau 
and Fawcett 2006; Willenborg et al. 2015). Therefore, if the documented effect of media 
coverage occurs through the information asymmetry reduction mechanism, such an effect 
should be stronger for news articles that focus on IPO firm earnings. To test this prediction, we 
use the RavenPack classification scheme to divide the news articles into three categories: (i) 
Earnings news, which includes news articles about the IPO firm’s earnings (e.g., earnings 
releases and earnings revisions), (ii) IPO news, which includes articles with news specific to 
the IPO (e.g., news about IPO approval, delay, and extension), and (iii) Other news, which 
includes news articles that do not belong to either of the two aforementioned categories. We 
count the number of news articles in each of these three categories and include the three (log-
transformed) counts in Equation (1). The results, reported in column (1) of Table 11, show that 
the coefficient of media coverage is significantly negative for each of the three categories. 
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Moreover, the coefficient of Earnings news is significantly larger (in absolute terms) than the 
coefficients of IPO news and Other news (highest p-value=0.02), consistent with the IPO firm 
earnings news playing a dominant role in reducing information asymmetry among investors. 
We further explore whether the documented effect of media coverage varies depending 
on article type. RavenPack classifies news articles into five types: full article, hot news flash, 
news flash, press release, and tabular material. In contrast to the other four types, news articles 
in the full article category have both a headline and textual material in the body. Since full 
articles are more informative, we expect the effect of media coverage on IPO pricing to be 
stronger for news articles in the full article category compared to news articles in other 
categories. To test this prediction, we divide the total number of news articles covering the firm 
into two categories: (i) Full articles, which includes news articles classified by RavenPack as 
full articles, and (ii) Other articles, which includes news articles in the other four categories. 
We count the number of news articles in each of these two categories and include the (log-
transformed) counts in Equation (1). The results, reported in column (2) of Table 11, show that 
the coefficient of media coverage is significantly negative for both categories. Moreover, the 
coefficient of Full article is significantly larger (in absolute terms) than the coefficient of Other 
articles (p-value=0.01). These results are consistent with the more informative news articles 
playing a more pronounced role in mitigating information asymmetry among IPO investors. 
We also explore whether the tone of media has an impact on the documented effect of 
media coverage. We reason that the role of media in reducing information asymmetry should 
be weaker when there is greater variance in the tone of the media (i.e., greater disagreement in 
media regarding IPO firm prospects). We employ the RavenPack event sentiment score (ESS) 
to capture the tone of the articles. The score ranges from 0 (extremely negative tone) to 100 
(extremely positive tone) where 50 represents neutral tone. Following Bushman et al. (2017), 
we assign a value of 1 if the ESS is greater than 50, a value of -1 if the ESS is less than 50, and 
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a value of 0 if the ESS is equal to 50. We calculate Media variation as the standard deviation 
of the transformed ESS of all the news articles about the IPO firm within the 30-day window 
prior to the IPO date and include the interaction term between Media coverage and Media 
variation in Equation (1). The results are reported in column (3) of Table 11 showing that the 
coefficient of Media coverage×Media variation is significantly positive (p-value<0.01). This 
result is consistent with greater level of divergence in media tone weakening the role of media 
in reducing information asymmetry among investors.  
We further examine whether sign of the media coverage-IPO initial returns relation is 
contingent upon the direction of the media tone. Information asymmetry reduction channel 
suggests that news articles convey information to investors, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry associated with the IPO. Hence, information asymmetry reduction channel predicts 
a negative association between media coverage and IPO underpricing irrespective of the tone 
of media. In contrast, investor attraction channel suggests that articles with positive (negative) 
tone induce positive (negative) sentiment among investors. This perspective suggests that the 
sign of the media coverage-IPO initial returns relation should be positive (negative) for the 
articles with positive (negative) tone. To examine which of these two channels operates in our 
setting, we classify news articles into Positive news (articles with ESS above 50), Negative 
news (articles with ESS below 50), and Neutral news (articles with ESS equal to 50) categories. 
We count the number of news articles in each of these categories and include the three (log-
transformed) counts in Equation (1). The results, reported in column (4) of Table 11, show that 
the coefficient of media coverage is significantly negative for all three categories (highest p-
value=0.064), supporting the information asymmetry reduction channel. The coefficients of 
Positive news and Negative news are both significantly larger (in absolute terms) than that of 
Neutral news (highest p-value=0.01), suggesting that the tone of media impacts the extent to 
which media coverage reduces IPO underpricing. 
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Last, we investigate whether the documented effect of media coverage varies with the 
timing of news articles. We divide the 30-day pre-IPO window into three 10-day time windows: 
[-10,-1], [-20,-11], and [-30,-21]. Then, we count the number of news articles in each time 
window and include the (log-transformed) counts in Equation (1). The results, reported in 
column (5) of Table 11, show that the coefficient of media coverage is significantly negative 
for the [-10,-1] and [-20,-11] time windows (highest p-value<0.01) and is negative and 
marginally significant for the [-30,-21] time window (p-value=0.089). Further, the coefficient 
of media coverage monotonically increases (in absolute terms) as we move from the [-30,-21] 
to [-10,-1] time window (p-value of the difference test=0.044). These results are consistent 
with the notion that news articles published closer to the listing date (i.e., when investor interest 
in the IPO is more likely to “heat-up” (Liu et al. 2014) play a more pronounced role in 
mitigating information asymmetry among IPO investors and thus, have a stronger effect on 
IPO underpricing. 
 [Insert Table 11 about here] 
C. Reconciliation with Prior U.S. Evidence 
We conclude by reconciling our findings with results from U.S.-based studies (Cook et 
al. 2006; Liu et al. 2017). Focusing predominantly on the pre-2000 period and using alternative 
databases (such as Factiva or LexisNexis) to capture media coverage, these studies document 
a positive association between media coverage and IPO initial returns on the U.S. market, 
consistent with the visibility enhancement channel.18 When considered within the context of 
these studies, our findings suggest that either (i) the sign of the media coverage-IPO returns 
relationship on the U.S. market is contingent on the choice of database used to construct a 
                                                 
18 As discussed in Section II, we follow extensive research in finance and accounting by using RavenPack database 
to construct our measure of media coverage. In our setting, RavenPack offers at least two key advantages over 
other media databases (such as Factiva or LexixNexis): (i) it provides a much more comprehensive coverage of 
non-U.S. IPOs and (ii) it classifies articles based on the topic and the tone of the article, which we use to facilitate 
identification of theoretical mechanism driving our findings (see discussion in Section VII.B). Since RavenPack 
begins its coverage in 2000, our analysis covers the post-2000 period. 
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media coverage measure, or (ii) the media coverage-IPO returns relationship on the U.S. 
market has undergone a structural shift in the post-2000 period. To examine the empirical 
relevance of these scenarios, in this section we focus our analysis on the U.S. market.  
To facilitate comparison with prior studies, we employ Factiva in searching news 
articles about U.S. IPO firms prior to the IPO date (Liu et al. 2014; 2017). Our U.S. sample 
consists of 2,348 IPOs that have information available in Factiva spanning the period 1993-
2014. We partition this sample to estimate two regressions: one using the 1993-2000 sample 
period (the sample period used by Cook et al. 2006, hereafter “pre-2000 period”) and one using 
the 2001-2014 period (hereafter “post-2000 period”). The results are reported in Panel A of 
Table 12. Consistent with Cook et al. (2006) and Liu et al. (2017), we document a positive 
association between media coverage and IPO initial returns in the pre-2000 period (p-
value<0.01). However, we also find that the sign of this relationship becomes significantly 
negative in the post-2000 period (p-value<0.01). This result is consistent with our findings in 
Panel A of Table 3 which use the RavenPack-based media coverage measure for U.S. IPOs. 
The results of robustness tests, reported in Panel B of Table 12, show that the documented shift 
in the sign is not driven by a decline in the information technology IPOs following the collapse 
of the dot-com bubble and is robust to using alternative measures of media coverage.  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Collectively, the results reported in Table 12 suggest that the visibility enhancement 
channel has shaped the media coverage-IPO pricing relationship on the U.S. market in the pre-
2000 period, whereas information asymmetry reduction channel dominates this relationship in 
the post-2000 period. This structural shift potentially reflects the confounding effect of two 
factors. First, there has been a significant decline in the U.S. IPO market activity since 2000 
(Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013). Prior research suggests that the role of firm visibility is particularly 
salient in a setting where investors have to interpret multiple signals coming from a large 
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number of firms (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009; Frederickson and Zolotoy 2016). By 
inference, the role of media in attracting investors’ attention to a new issue is expected to be 
more salient in highly active IPO market, with multiple firms going public within a short period 
of time. Therefore, a decline in the IPO activity may have weakened the visibility enhancement 
role of media in the U.S. IPO market.19 Second, major financial turmoils in the post-2000 
period—such as the collapse of the dot-com bubble, prominent accounting scandals (e.g., 
Enron and Worldcom), and the Great Recession—have eroded investors’ trust in corporations 
and capital markets (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Lins et al. 2017). A decline of public trust in 
formal corporate governance and regulatory mechanisms may have elevated the role of media 
as an informal (“extra-legal”) monitoring institution (Klausner 2005; Borden 2007) in reducing 
information-related risks through disclosure and dissemination of information to investors. 
VIII. Conclusions 
We examine the effect of media coverage on IPO pricing in markets around the world. 
We find that higher pre-IPO media coverage, on average, leads to lower IPO initial returns. 
The documented effect of media coverage is mitigated in countries with higher financial 
reporting quality, stronger shareholder rights protection, and more stringent media censorship, 
while amplified in countries with higher levels of media penetration and media trust. Further, 
the effect of media coverage is mitigated for IPOs with stronger certification characteristics 
and IPOs with greater variance in the tone of the media. We also find that IPOs with higher 
pre-IPO media coverage have lower ex-post price revision volatility. Taken together, our 
findings suggest that higher pre-IPO media coverage reduces information asymmetry among 
investors, leading to less underpriced IPOs. 
                                                 
19 Gao et al. (2013) report that during 1980–2000, an average of 310 companies per year went public in the U.S. 
Since 2000, the average has been only 99 IPOs per year. They further report that the drop was especially 
precipitous among small firms—i.e., firms that are less visible to investors (Frederickson and Zolotoy 2016). 
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We contribute to the emerging literature that examines the impact of media on capital 
markets (see Tetlock 2015 for a review). So far, this literature has been predominantly U.S.-
centric, thus offering limited insights on the role of media in the global markets (Griffin et al. 
2011). We also contribute to the literature on IPO pricing (see Ljungqvist 2007 for a review) 
by showing that higher level of pre-IPO media coverage results in less underpriced IPOs. We 
also contribute to the literature that examines the role of financial disclosure standards and legal 
institutions in capital markets (LaPorta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2008; Spamann 2010; He 
and Hu 2014). Collectively, our findings cast media as an important “informational 
intermediary” in IPO pricing in markets around the world, and thus should be of interest to 
academic researchers, investors, and regulators. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Accounting conservatism 
Country-specific accounting conservatism score based on 
Boulton et al. (2017). 
Advertising intensity 
Advertising expenses divided by sales of the IPO firm at the time 
of listing. 
Age 
Log transformation of 1 plus the difference in years since the firm 
was established up to the year of listing. 
Asset turnover Sales divided by total assets of the IPO firm at the time of listing. 
Big 4 auditor 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditing firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Bookbuilding 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if IPO uses bookbuilding method, and 
0 otherwise. 
Cash balance 
Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets of the IPO 
firm at time of listing. 
Civil law 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if IPO firm is listed in a civil law 
country, and 0 otherwise. 
Confidence in Press 
Country-specific confidence in press measure from the World 
Value Survey, orthogonalized to Shareholder right and Earnings 
opacity. 
Confidence in TV News 
Country-specific confidence in TV news measure from the World 
Value Survey, orthogonalized to Shareholder right and Earnings 
opacity. 
Earnings opacity 
Country-specific earnings earning opacity score, based on 
Boulton et al. (2011). 
Emerging 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if IPO firm is listed in an emerging 
market, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm size 
Log transformation of total assets of IPO firm (in million US$) at 
time of listing.  
First-day return 
IPO first-day closing price minus offer price, scaled by offer 
price.  
Float 
Regular shares issued to the public for trading divided by total 
number of outstanding shares. 
GDP per capita growth 
Country-specific GDP per capita growth in year of IPO firm 
listing. 
Hot issue market 
Average initial return for IPOs issued during the three months 
prior to month of firm IPO.  
Internet censorship 
Country-specific internet freedom measure from Freedom House, 
orthogonalized to Shareholder right and Earnings opacity. 
Internet users 
Country-specific proportion of people subscribing to internet in 
year of IPO firm listing. 
IPO size 
Total IPO proceeds divided by Total Assets of the IPO firm at 
time of listing. 
Leverage Total Debt divided by total assets of the IPO firm at time of listing. 
Market-to-book Market-to-Book value of the IPO firm at time of listing. 
Market size 
Country-specific total value of stock traded divided by GDP at 
year of IPO listing. 
Market turnover Country-specific turnover ratio of the year of IPO firm listing. 
Media coverage 
Log transformation of number of times IPO firm is cited in media 
up to 30 days prior to listing. 
Media coverage_Earnings news 
Log transformation of number of times news cited in media up to 
30 days prior to listing is earnings related. 
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Media coverage_IPO news 
Log transformation of number of times news cited in media up to 
30 days prior to listing is IPO related. 
Media coverage_Other news 
Log transformation of number of times news cited in media up to 
30 days prior to listing is something other than IPO/earnings 
related. 
Media coverage_Full article 
Log transformation of number of times there is a full article 
about the IPO firm in media up to 30 days prior to listing. 
Media coverage_Other article 
Log transformation of number of times there is an article other 
than a full article i.e. newsflash, hot newsflash, press release and 
tabular material about the IPO firm in the media up to 30 days 
prior to listing. 
Media coverage_Positive news 
Log transformation of number of times news cited in media up to 
30-days prior to listing has positive sentiment. 
Media coverage_Negative news 
Log transformation of number of times news cited in media up to 
30-days prior to listing has negative sentiment. 
Media coverage_Neutral news 
Log transformation of number of times news cited in media up to 
30-days prior to listing has neutral sentiment. 
Media coverage_[-10,-1] 
Log transformation of number of times IPO firm is cited in media 
during days [-10,-1] prior to listing. 
Media coverage_[-20,-11] 
Log transformation of number of times IPO firm is cited in media 
during days [-20,-11] prior to listing. 
Media coverage_[-30,-21] 
Log transformation of number of times IPO firm is cited in media 
during days [-30,-21] prior to listing. 
Media variation 
Standard deviation of the transformed event sentiment score 
among all the news articles about the IPO firm up to 30-days prior 
to listing. 
Newspaper users Country-specific proportion of people subscribing to newspapers.  
Press censorship 
Country-specific press freedom measure from Freedom House 
orthogonalized to Shareholder right and Earnings opacity. 
Profitability EBIT divided by total assets of the IPO firm at the time of listing. 
Proximity to DJ branch 
Categorical variable equal to 2 if the IPO firm is headquartered in 
a metropolitan area with at least one Dow Jones office, equal to 1 
if the IPO firm is headquartered in a country with at least one Dow 
Jones office but in a metropolitan area with no Dow Jones office, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Revision_Vol_AbsRes Absolute value of the price revision regression residual. 
Revision_Vol_SqRes Square of the price revision regression residual. 
ROA 
Net income divided by total assets of IPO firm, measured at the 
end of the first fiscal years after IPO listing. 
Security law 
Country-specific Securities Law variable for the year of IPO firm 
listing, based on LaPorta et al. (2006). 
Shareholder right 
Country-specific Shareholder Rights Index based on Djankov et 
al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). 
Underwriter 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the investment bank underwriting 
the IPO is in top quartile, and 0 otherwise, based on Lin et al. 
(2013). 
VC back 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm is backed by venture 
capital, and 0 otherwise. 
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FIGURE 1 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: Univariate Analysis 
Figure 1 plots the average IPO first-day return for deciles by media coverage. We divide the sample 
into deciles of number of times an IPO firm is cited up to 30 days prior to the listing date and plot the 
mean first-day return for each decile. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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FIGURE 2 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: Semiparametric Regression Analysis 
Figure 2 plots the relation between media coverage and IPO first-day returns estimated using Robinson 
(1988) semi-parametric regression technique. The link function between IPO first-day return and media 
coverage (solid line) was estimated non-parametrically using kernel method. The explanatory variable 
was trimmed at 0.1% at the upper tail to mitigate the potential impact of outliers on the non-parametric 
estimate of the regression curve. The grey area denotes pointwise 95% confidence interval. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution and summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Our 
sample consists of 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries spanning the period 2000 to 2014. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Country Distribution 
Country No. of IPO 
Average First-day 
Return 
Average No. of News 
Articles 
Argentina 10 0.321 12.700 
Australia 868 0.322 11.561 
Austria 28 0.186 14.714 
Belgium 47 0.181 8.936 
Brazil 111 0.202 7.919 
Canada 578 0.298 13.054 
Chile 20 0.240 12.250 
China 1,463 0.704 8.648 
Denmark 36 0.339 11.250 
Finland 17 0.031 17.529 
France 314 0.161 13.908 
Germany 246 0.111 13.841 
Greece 106 0.098 19.406 
Hong Kong 452 0.375 10.907 
India 460 0.296 12.104 
Indonesia 165 0.431 11.739 
Ireland 22 0.788 6.409 
Italy 131 0.166 9.122 
Japan 1,191 0.470 13.219 
Malaysia 449 0.283 16.744 
Mexico 17 0.323 8.529 
Netherland 52 0.328 19.673 
New Zealand 38 0.130 13.079 
Norway 72 0.283 12.417 
Philippines 30 0.425 12.433 
Poland 150 0.486 11.687 
Portugal 10 -0.089 17.900 
Russia 49 0.148 10.673 
Singapore 364 0.320 12.665 
Spain 39 0.158 12.487 
Sweden 70 0.187 15.457 
Switzerland 53 0.129 9.962 
Taiwan 739 0.186 24.553 
Thailand 256 0.252 12.395 
Turkey 46 0.025 19.065 
South Africa 23 0.487 17.087 
South Korea  601 0.407 13.388 
U.K. 934 0.397 6.687 
U.S. 1,459 0.373 22.600 
Total 11,716 0.387 14.058 
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Panel B: Year Distribution 
Year No. of IPOs 
Average First-day 
Return 
Average No. of News 
Articles 
2000 1,118 0.204 10.240 
2001 625 0.256 12.894 
2002 598 0.260 14.237 
2003 627 0.344 11.764 
2004 1,147 0.343 13.428 
2005 1,134 0.310 12.326 
2006 1,303 0.317 12.450 
2007 1,510 0.366 14.350 
2008 566 0.272 11.733 
2009 365 0.624 21.858 
2010 750 0.720 15.231 
2011 652 0.652 16.268 
2012 453 0.542 19.119 
2013 475 0.592 17.091 
2014 393 0.616 19.802 
Total 11,716 0.387 14.058 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 5% Median 95% 
First-day return 0.387 0.560 -0.200 0.221 1.600 
Media coverage 1.755 1.373 0.000 1.609 4.304 
Firm size 4.811 1.779 2.046 4.705 7.874 
Profitability 0.042 0.170 -0.380 0.054 0.293 
Leverage 0.121 0.191 0.006 0.033 0.542 
Market-to-book 3.682 4.545 0.694 2.380 10.730 
Asset turnover 0.769 0.805 0.000 0.553 2.426 
Bookbuilding 0.588 0.492 0.000 1.000 1.000 
GDP per capita growth 0.039 0.035 -0.002 0.026 0.099 
Market size 1.195 0.941 0.229 1.022 3.052 
Market turnover 1.164 0.602 0.343 1.040 2.165 
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TABLE 2 
Media Coverage and IPO First-day Return: Baseline Regression Results 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the relation between media coverage and IPO first-day return. 
Our sample consists of 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The 
regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry 
classification, year of listing fixed effects, and country of listing fixed effects are included in all the 
regressions. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.040 -11.68 -0.038 -11.24 -0.037 -11.04 
Firm size   0.006 1.70 0.005 1.74 
Profitability   0.078 2.37 0.080 2.43 
Leverage   0.258 7.68 0.263 7.79 
Market-to-book   0.003 2.64 0.003 2.83 
Asset turnover   -0.041 -5.54 -0.041 -5.56 
Bookbuilding   -0.142 -10.82 -0.149 -11.32 
GDP per capita growth     0.035 0.10 
Market size     0.058 4.49 
Market turnover     0.018 0.93 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,716 11,716 11,716 
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.190 0.194 
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TABLE 3 
Media Coverage and IPO First-day Return: Country and Year Regressions 
Table 3 presents country-by-country and year-by-year regression results for the relation between media 
coverage and IPO first-day return. For brevity, the table only reports the coefficient of media coverage. 
Our sample consists of 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries spanning the period 2000 to 2014. In Panel A, 
we only include the regression results for countries for which we have at least 50 or more IPOs over the 
sample period. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Control variables and fixed effects are included in all the regressions but 
not tabulated for brevity. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Country Regressions 
Country Co-eff. t-stat. Adjusted R2 Observations 
Australia -0.027 -2.30 0.251 868 
Brazil -0.066 -1.87 0.366 111 
Canada -0.050 -2.62 0.140 578 
China -0.128 -10.01 0.334 1,463 
France -0.053 -3.67 0.244 314 
Germany -0.028 -0.98 0.299 246 
Greece 0.000 0.01 0.413 106 
Hong Kong -0.015 -0.74 0.293 452 
Indonesia -0.091 -2.15 0.327 165 
India -0.046 -2.67 0.432 460 
Italy 0.006 0.18 0.436 131 
Japan -0.061 -6.12 0.215 1,191 
Malaysia -0.071 -5.51 0.257 449 
Netherland -0.127 -1.81 0.494 52 
Norway 0.008 0.22 0.680 72 
Poland -0.114 -3.18 0.473 150 
Singapore -0.044 -2.69 0.277 364 
South Korea  -0.069 -4.66 0.230 601 
Sweden -0.067 -1.79 0.353 70 
Switzerland 0.108 1.49 0.337 53 
Thailand -0.026 -1.69 0.268 256 
Taiwan -0.011 -1.30 0.213 739 
U.K. -0.026 -1.99 0.282 934 
U.S. -0.061 -4.14 0.226 1,459 
 
Panel B: Year Regressions 
Year Co-eff. t-stat. Adjusted R2 Observations 
2000 -0.017 -1.46 0.337 1,118 
2001 -0.028 -2.17 0.269 625 
2002 -0.015 -1.27 0.210 598 
2003 -0.029 -2.21 0.225 627 
2004 -0.039 -3.85 0.223 1,147 
2005 -0.021 -2.19 0.284 1,134 
2006 -0.032 -3.31 0.169 1,303 
2007 -0.018 -1.89 0.252 1,510 
2008 0.005 0.34 0.229 566 
2009 -0.114 -4.34 0.359 365 
2010 -0.131 -7.87 0.427 750 
2011 -0.081 -4.50 0.357 652 
2012 -0.052 -2.27 0.326 453 
2013 -0.053 -1.98 0.299 475 
2014 -0.041 -1.73 0.322 393 
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TABLE 4 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: Robustness Checks 
Table 4 presents the regression results for various robustness checks for the relation between media 
coverage and IPO first-day return. For brevity, the table only reports the coefficient of media coverage. 
Our sample consists of up to 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries depending upon the model specification 
spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed 
using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Control variables, constant, industry fixed effects 
based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry classification, year of listing fixed effects, and country of listing 
fixed effects are included in all the regressions but not tabulated for brevity. Variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Alternative measures of IPO initial return 
(1) IPO return over 1-week after listing 
Dependent variable: One-week return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.048 -4.46 
(2) IPO return over 2 weeks after listing 
Dependent variable: Two-week return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.047 -3.44 
Panel B: Alternative measures of media coverage 
(1) News articles in 60 days prior to IPO 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.036 -10.64 
(2) News articles in 90 days prior to IPO 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.033 -10.15 
(3) Media data from Factiva 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.044 -7.87 
Panel C: Additional control variables 
(1) Include additional control variables – IPO float, age, size, cash balance, advertising intensity and 
hot issue market 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.045 -11.08 
Panel D: Alternative sample specifications 
(1) Exclude IPOs with zero media coverage 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.074 -19.18 
Panel E: Decomposition of IPO initial return 
(1) Primary market return 
Dependent variable: Primary market return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.046 -5.91 
(4) Secondary market return 
Dependent variable: Secondary market return 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.002 -0.68 
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TABLE 5 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: National Media Strikes as Exogenous Shocks 
Table 5 presents the regression results using national media strikes as exogenous shocks to media 
coverage. Our sample consists of 581 IPOs that were listed between 2000 and 2014 in the countries that 
experienced at least one media strike during this period. Strike is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
IPO has at least one media strike taking place in the same country during the 30-day window prior to 
the IPO date, and zero otherwise. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed 
using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth 
French’s 10-industry classification, year of listing fixed effects, and country of listing fixed effects are 
included. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Comparison of IPOs with and without media strike 
 Strike = 0 
(n = 519) 
Strike = 1 
(n = 62) 
Difference t-stat. 
Mean number of news articles 14.202 9.726 4.476 2.09 
 
Panel B: Regression analysis on the effect of media strikes 
Dependent Variable: First-day return 
 (1) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. 
Strike  0.160 2.18 
Firm size -0.047 -3.32 
Profitability 0.178 1.47 
Leverage 0.569 3.10 
Market-to-book -0.003 -0.74 
Asset turnover -0.046 -1.98 
Bookbuilding 0.037 0.76 
GDP per capita growth 6.148 1.79 
Market size -0.507 -2.49 
Market turnover 0.228 1.70 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Country FE Yes 
Observations 581 
Adjusted R2 0.199 
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TABLE 6 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Table 6 presents the results for the instrumental variable estimation, with t-statistics computed using 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Our sample consists of 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries 
spanning the period 2000 to 2014. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-
industry classification, year of listing fixed effects, and country of listing fixed effects are included in 
all the regressions. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: Media coverage First-day return 
 (1) (2) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Proximity to DJ branch 0.054 2.62   
Media coverage   -0.375 -3.35 
Firm size 0.031 3.68 -0.014 -1.86 
Profitability -0.140 -1.76 0.116 1.80 
Leverage -0.093 -1.44 0.241 2.97 
Market-to-book -0.002 -0.63 0.003 1.57 
Asset turnover 0.023 1.29 -0.035 -1.81 
Bookbuilding 0.117 3.60 -0.121 -2.32 
GDP per capita growth 2.280 2.57 0.579 0.32 
Market size -0.124 -4.04 0.028 0.29 
Market turnover 0.088 2.08 0.039 0.54 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Observations 11,716 11,716 
Adjusted R2 0.190 - 
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TABLE 7 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: The Moderating Effect of Country-Level Institutions 
Table 7 presents the regression results for the effects of country-level institutions on the relation between media coverage and IPO first-day return. Our sample consists of up to 
11,716 IPOs across 39 countries depending upon the model specification spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed 
using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry classification and year of listing fixed effects are 
included in all the regressions. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.128 -7.86 -0.058 -7.97 -0.122 -9.59 -0.078 -3.99 -0.009 -1.88 -0.031 -7.82 
Media coverage*Earning opacity -0.286 -10.10           
Earnings opacity 0.247 4.68           
Media coverage*Accounting Conservatism   0.148 5.47         
Accounting Conservatism   -0.551 -7.41         
Media coverage*Shareholder rights     0.021 6.55       
Shareholder right     -0.099 -2.30       
Media coverage*Security law       0.439 3.64     
Security law       0.209 0.76     
Media coverage*Civil law         -0.060 -8.68   
Civil law         0.151 7.60   
Media coverage*Emerging           -0.040 -4.62 
Emerging           0.120 5.15 
Firm size 0.021 6.15 -0.002 -0.68 0.009 2.56 0.019 5.87 0.016 4.77 0.014 4.30 
Profitability -0.012 -0.37 0.053 1.60 0.093 2.82 0.076 2.35 0.069 2.10 0.045 1.38 
Leverage 0.306 8.82 0.345 9.69 0.285 8.40 0.284 8.40 0.291 8.57 0.278 8.15 
Market-to-book 0.004 3.40 0.005 4.05 0.004 3.60 0.004 3.47 0.004 3.58 0.004 3.87 
Asset turnover -0.035 -4.70 -0.021 -2.76 -0.031 -4.08 -0.036 -4.71 -0.038 -5.07 -0.031 -4.09 
Bookbuilding -0.089 -7.48 -0.029 -2.42 -0.067 -5.81 -0.058 -4.93 -0.071 -6.04 -0.059 -5.08 
GDP per capita growth -0.596 -2.70 -1.914 -9.49 0.072 0.39 1.444 8.35 1.250 7.28 0.245 1.36 
Market size 0.035 4.74 0.055 6.97 0.044 5.93 0.013 1.57 0.036 4.34 0.042 5.75 
Market turnover 0.080 6.82 0.006 0.52 0.039 3.27 0.083 7.12 0.058 4.79 0.090 7.71 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No No No No 
Observations 11,497 10,054 11,716 11,716 11,716 11,716 
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.112 0.134 0.119 0.124 0.130 
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TABLE 8 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: The Moderating Effect of Country-Level Media Characteristics 
Table 8 presents the regression results for the effects of country-level media characteristics on the relation between media coverage and IPO first-day return. Our sample consists 
of up to 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries depending upon the model specification spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry classification and year of listing fixed 
effects are included in all the regressions. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.026 -3.60 -0.041 -4.59 -0.040 -11.42 -0.045 -10.79 -0.038 -10.84 -0.036 -10.26 
Media coverage*Newspaper users -0.066 -2.80           
Newspaper users 0.042 0.67           
Media coverage*Internet users   -0.024 -2.15         
Internet users   0.043 0.90         
Media coverage*Press censorship     0.173 16.85       
Press censorship     -0.032 -7.75       
Media coverage*Internet censorship       0.215 13.59     
Internet censorship       -0.043 -8.55     
Media coverage*Confidence in press         -0.034 -9.44   
Confidence in press         0.149 15.91   
Media coverage*Confidence in TV News           -0.039 -10.86 
Confidence in TV News           0.168 17.60 
Firm size 0.018 5.47 0.012 3.62 0.014 4.34 0.011 3.05 0.022 6.51 0.023 6.85 
Profitability 0.076 2.35 0.062 1.85 0.011 0.32 0.082 2.23 -0.027 -0.82 -0.023 -0.69 
Leverage 0.280 8.27 0.276 8.01 0.295 8.57 0.251 6.86 0.281 7.99 0.276 7.90 
Market-to-book 0.004 3.46 0.004 3.55 0.005 3.96 0.005 3.78 0.005 3.92 0.005 3.97 
Asset turnover -0.035 -4.59 -0.037 -4.68 -0.023 -3.03 -0.025 -2.91 -0.035 -4.58 -0.034 -4.48 
Bookbuilding -0.059 -5.10 -0.072 -5.99 -0.046 -3.99 -0.060 -4.57 -0.094 -7.84 -0.092 -7.69 
GDP per capita growth 1.243 7.26 2.477 10.28 -0.693 -3.70 -0.735 -1.99 0.782 4.63 0.544 3.20 
Market size 0.022 3.01 0.010 1.36 0.030 4.23 0.090 6.18 0.044 6.03 0.035 4.84 
Market turnover 0.080 6.93 0.104 8.73 0.092 7.93 0.015 0.88 0.074 6.32 0.081 6.85 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No No No No 
Observations 11,716 10,977 11,497 9,352 11,248 11,248 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.139 0.149 0.163 0.146 0.150 
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TABLE 9 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: The Moderating Effect of IPO Certification 
Table 9 presents the regression results for the effect of IPO certification on the relation between media 
coverage and IPO first-day return. Our sample consists of 10,681 IPOs for which we have data on 
certification characteristics across 39 countries spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The regressions are 
performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry classification, year of listing 
fixed effects, and country of listing fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Variable definitions 
are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage -0.053 -12.82 -0.053 -12.08 -0.049 -11.75 
Media coverage*VC back 0.041 4.92     
VC back -0.060 -2.87     
Media coverage*Big 4 auditor   0.093 3.87   
Big 4 auditor   -0.072 -3.66   
Media coverage*Underwriter     0.052 2.54 
Underwriter     -0.024 -1.19 
Firm size 0.004 1.00 0.004 0.98 0.003 0.84 
Profitability 0.087 2.50 0.075 2.15 0.075 2.15 
Leverage 0.267 7.81 0.261 7.61 0.258 7.50 
Market-to-book 0.003 2.69 0.003 2.64 0.003 2.74 
Asset turnover -0.047 -6.16 -0.049 -6.35 -0.048 -6.23 
Bookbuilding -0.153 -11.06 -0.151 -10.90 -0.153 -11.07 
GDP per capita growth -0.142 -0.38 -0.118 -0.32 -0.169 -0.45 
Market size 0.060 4.56 0.060 4.49 0.061 4.61 
Market turnover 0.010 0.48 0.010 0.47 0.008 0.41 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,681 10,681 10,681 
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.195 0.195 
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TABLE 10 
Media Coverage and IPO Information Asymmetry 
Table 10 presents the results of the test of information asymmetry channel. Our sample consists of 4,794 
IPOs that are priced using the bookbuilding approach and for which we have price revision data 
available across 39 countries spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The regressions are performed by OLS, 
with t-statistics computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed 
effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry classification, year of listing fixed effects, and country 
of listing fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
A. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return 
Revision_Vol_Sq
SqRes 
Revision_Vol_A
AbsRes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Revision_Vol_SqRes 1.264 2.66       
Revision_Vol_AbsRes   0.361 2.90     
Media coverage      -0.001 -3.30 -0.003 -2.83 
Firm size -0.006 -1.04 -0.006 -1.00 -0.001 -2.70 -0.003 -3.53 
Profitability 0.103 2.01 0.103 2.03 0.003 1.24 0.006 0.92 
Leverage 0.187 4.35 0.183 4.27 0.002 1.61 0.018 3.40 
Market-to-book 0.005 2.74 0.005 2.77 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.22 
Asset turnover -0.082 -7.97 -0.082 -7.96 -0.001 -2.42 -0.004 -2.37 
GDP per capita growth 0.312 0.51 0.313 0.51 -0.026 -1.11 -0.093 -1.12 
Market size 0.049 2.01 0.049 2.02 -0.003 -2.52 -0.010 -2.86 
Market turnover 0.069 1.93 0.069 1.94 0.002 1.29 0.005 0.94 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,794 4,794 4,794 4,794 
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.187 0.073 0.077 
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TABLE 11 
Media Coverage and IPO First-Day Return: News Characteristics 
Table 11 presents the regression results for the effect of news characteristics on the relation between media coverage and IPO first-day return. Our sample 
consists of 11,716 IPOs across 39 countries spanning the period 2000 to 2014. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects, are included in all the regressions. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage_Earnings news -0.033 -6.65         
Media coverage_IPO news -0.022 -3.90         
Media coverage_Other news -0.017 -3.51         
Media coverage_Full article   -0.031 -6.17       
Media coverage_Other article   -0.016 -3.36       
Media coverage     -0.081 -9.08     
Media coverage*Media variation     0.109 2.64     
Media variation     0.163 2.02     
Media coverage_Positive news       -0.040 -6.67   
Media coverage_Negative news       -0.038 -9.41   
Media coverage_Neutral news       -0.010 -1.85   
Media coverage_[-10,-1]         -0.025 -3.07 
Media coverage_[-20,-11]         -0.015 -2.58 
Media coverage_[-30,-21]         -0.009 -1.70 
Firm size 0.004 1.16 0.005 1.28 -0.003 -0.84 -0.003 -0.93 0.005 1.31 
Profitability 0.078 2.39 0.080 2.43 0.072 2.20 0.067 2.04 0.086 2.61 
Leverage 0.263 7.79 0.263 7.80 0.229 6.86 0.234 7.00 0.264 7.80 
Market-to-book 0.003 2.91 0.003 2.88 0.004 3.58 0.004 3.61 0.003 2.93 
Asset turnover -0.040 -5.48 -0.040 -5.52 -0.048 -6.50 -0.047 -6.36 -0.041 -5.56 
Bookbuilding -0.149 -11.29 -0.150 -11.38 -0.152 -11.36 -0.151 -11.29 -0.152 -11.49 
GDP per capita growth 0.032 0.09 0.020 0.06 -0.375 -1.06 -0.401 -1.14 -0.016 -0.05 
Market size 0.057 4.46 0.059 4.56 0.041 3.30 0.042 3.39 0.058 4.49 
Market turnover 0.018 0.94 0.017 0.91 0.009 0.49 0.008 0.40 0.020 1.02 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,716 11,716 9,431 9,431 11,716 
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.195 0.188 0.189 0.191 
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TABLE 12 
Media Coverage and IPO First-day Return: Reconciliation with U.S. Evidence 
Table 12 presents the regression results of the relation between media coverage and IPO first-day return 
in the U.S. market using Factiva data. Our sample consists of 2,348 IPOs in the U.S. spanning the period 
1993 to 2014. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Constant, industry fixed effects based on Kenneth French’s 10-industry 
classification, year of listing fixed effects, and country of listing fixed effects are included in all the 
regressions. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A. Main results 
 
Sample Period 
1993-2000 
Sample Period 
2001-2014 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) 
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage 0.110 4.35 -0.063 -5.13 
Firm size -0.020 -1.81 0.028 2.22 
Profitability 0.317 5.67 0.013 0.17 
Leverage -0.028 -0.35 0.079 1.26 
Market-to-book 0.034 2.48 0.009 2.97 
Asset turnover -0.110 -3.66 -0.101 -5.22 
Bookbuilding -1.089 -2.26 0.203 3.06 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,289 1,059 
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.132 
     
Panel B. Robustness tests 
 
Sample Period 
1993-2000 
Sample Period 
2001-2014 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) 
(1) Exclude IPOs in the IT industry     
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage 0.112 4.23 -0.062 -4.89 
(2) News articles in 60 days prior to IPO     
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage 0.139 4.38 -0.068 -5.26 
(3) News articles in 90 days prior to IPO     
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage 0.153 4.40 -0.082 -5.89 
(4) Different types of articles     
 Co-eff. t-stat. Co-eff. t-stat. 
Media coverage_Full article 0.231 2.53 -0.089 -4.43 
Media coverage_Other article 0.017 0.19 -0.036 -2.05 
 
